

The Guatemala Connection

**While Congress slept,
U.S. arms merchants
delivered the goods**

BY ALLAN NAIRN

In the spring of 1982, as Washington debated whether to restore military aid to Guatemala, a succession of Administration spokesmen came before Congress to heap scorn on the recently toppled regime of General Fernando Romeo Lucas Garcia. Elliot Abrams, then head of the State Department's human-rights division, charged the Lucas government with waging "a war against the populace." Stephen Bosworth, then Assistant Secretary of State, called the counterinsurgency tactics "as abhorrent as they were counterproductive." A senior U.S. diplomat in Guatemala provided the details: "We knew perfectly well," he told me, "that they were raiding villages and taking out all males from fourteen up, tying their hands behind their backs, torturing and killing them."

Congress had curtailed military aid to Guatemala in 1977 on human-rights grounds, but the Reagan Administration argued that the new government of General Efraín Ríos Montt was improving conditions dramatically. The Administration was requesting only a modest appropriation to buy spare parts for three army helicopters, yet the matter would occupy Congress for two years of protracted debate until the parts were finally delivered in 1984.

Unknown to Congress, however, the entire debate was a sham. Quietly, behind the scenes, the Reagan Administration had been presiding over the delivery to General Lucas's army of a large quantity of military goods. These shipments appear to have exceeded in value those received from abroad by any Central American nation—El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua included. Some of these deliveries were illegal; all were contrary to Congress's expressed intent to withhold lethal aid from Guatemala.

Currently, Congress is considering re-negotiation of an open military relationship with Guatemala, which has the worst human-rights record in the Western hemisphere. The Pentagon again is requesting very modest amounts of aid, this time \$10 million for army engineers, medical

evacuation teams, and a military bomb squad. But as in 1982, other—more deadly—transactions are occurring. Guatemala continues to receive a steady flow of underground shipments from U.S. distributors, and other private deals are pending.

As all eyes are turned on the issue of U.S. aid to the *contras* in Nicaragua, this ongoing, surreptitious, at-times-illegal effort to bolster Guatemala's repressive capabilities goes unnoticed.

Mass Transit Systems Corporation of Philadelphia has been supplying the Guatemalan government with laser-aimed rifle sights "for several years," according to company president Leon Kopyt. The sight is placed on the barrel of a Galil rifle or M-16, projecting a small red dot onto the target's body.

"Where the laser beam shines, that's where the bullet goes," says Cathy Hill of Laser Products in Fountain Valley, California, the weapon's principal U.S. manufacturer. "It's a no-miss situation. I've seen them at night out to 500 yards. Beautiful, absolutely incredible. With a high-powered rifle, you could pretty much do what you want."

Weapons experts say the sight is used primarily for night fighting and close-in,

house-to-house operations. The sight is an advanced, still-developing technology employed mostly by elite army and police units. Bill Brokhousen of Tactel, a Laguna, California, laser-sight maker, says the U.S. Army's Delta Force and various Israeli commando units use the sights. Cathy Hill says her firm has supplied them to the army of Colombia.

In 1984, an application was filed with the State Department Office of Munitions Control to sell Guatemala 3,350 laser-aimed sights for M-16s at a price of \$7,705,000. The application was RETURNED WITHOUT ACTION. Jim Casen, the State Department's Guatemala desk officer, says U.S. policy precludes approval of such lethal equipment deals.

But Mass Transit Systems has been shipping the sights right along. "We already have a connection in Guatemala," says Kopyt. "We're already dealing." Kopyt says Mass Transit obtains the sights overseas—at a location he declines to disclose—and therefore does not need a State Department license. According to company sales materials circulating in Guatemala, Mass Transit also has supplied grenade launchers to plantation owners and the Guatemalan army.

According to individuals close to the U.S. intelligence community, Mass Transit

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ERIC FORSMAN

One of the few remaining spotted owls.

enough old growth to support 1,000 of the remaining pairs of owls, but current policy provides for only 550 pairs. The acreage set aside for each pair is also inadequate: The Forest Service and BLM now protect 1,000 acres per pair of owls even though research demonstrates a range of 2,200 acres or more.

"We're using minimums across the board, whether it's habitat or quality of habitat," says Eric Forsman, a leading spotted-owl researcher. "The agencies tend to use the minimums and then make rules in the plan using that. If you provide any species with minimum habitat, minimum quality, and minimum population, it's unlikely that they're going to thrive. If you go with the

minimum, you're asking for it. The risk of failure is high. You don't have any wiggle room."

As the spotted owl goes, so go a variety of other species. "About 3.5 million acres of the last pristine natural forest left in the United States is at stake," says Andy Stahl of the National Wildlife Federation. "The old-growth forests are among the most spectacular forests. They provide unparalleled salmon habitat, the best municipal watersheds, some of the best elk-hunting areas. It's a classic conflict, perhaps the classic conflict, over the use of public land."

Ironically, destroying the remaining old growth won't do much to help the Northwest's troubled timber industry,

whose future lies in second growth. The corporate giants—the Weyerhaeusers and the Scott Papers—have already made the move. It's the loggers and sawmill operators dependent on Federally owned old growth that are having the toughest time adjusting to the changing nature of the industry.

The small guys like Babe Giebel are only buying time. Before long, all the old mills designed to cut mammoth first-growth trees will have to be shut down or rebuilt. That change can be made either before or after the last of the giants are cut.

—KEITH ERVIN

(Keith Ervin is a free-lance writer based in Seattle.)

U.S. Steel Abandons Utah

OREM, UTAH

Twenty-two years ago, when Dennis Holdaway came to work at U.S. Steel, he had no inkling that he would ever be laid off. Beginning in the blast furnace right after graduating from high school, Holdaway—who would become the president of the steelworkers' local at the Geneva Works in Orem, Utah—started as a laborer at \$2.60 an hour. After seven years, he got an apprenticeship. Then he became a journeyman and figured he was guaranteed good money for life.

U.S. Steel was like part of the family for Holdaway, whose father helped build the Geneva mill during World War II, whose father-in-law led the unionization drive in the late 1940s, whose brothers work there, and whose children were born and raised in the mill's shadow.

It all ended last summer. Like 2,500 other Geneva workers who preceded him into unemployment, Dennis Holdaway was laid off. He is still out of work, resigned now

to uprooting his family and looking for a job in another state.

In November 1984, researchers at Brigham Young University predicted that the Geneva Works would close, citing all the warning signs: trickling layoffs, an aging work force, production speedups, demands for concessions, liquidation of inventories, poor maintenance, and lack of investment in new technology. U.S. Steel flew executives in from Pittsburgh to issue heated denials and promise a long-term commitment to Utah.

When the chamber of commerce in nearby Provo set up a task force to explore the region's options in case of Geneva's demise, the steel executives showed up again, this time with a \$10,000 donation toward a new building for the chamber. The chamber's board changed its mind about the task force.

"We have no intention of leaving," proclaimed U.S. Steel chairman David Roderick in May 1985. "We will not abandon Geneva for greener pastures," promised senior

vice president Thomas Usher in June. "The reports of our death are greatly exaggerated," said Geneva Works manager Warren Bartel last fall.

In December, U.S. Steel announced it was shutting down Geneva, curtailing op-



GARY MCKELLAR


Shift change at the Geneva Works involves only a trickle of workers.

erations over the next several years. The decision marks the spread of steel shutdowns beyond the East and Midwest into the Rocky Mountains and the nation's high-growth states. The plant is being dumped so U.S. Steel can consummate a deal with "the enemy"—one of the foreign steel companies that have penetrated 60 per cent of the market in the Western United States.

Pohang Iron and Steel of South Korea has been invited to buy half of U.S. Steel's finishing facility in Pittsburg, California, which had been the major customer of the Geneva Works, receiving up to 70 per cent of its product. Geneva, built during World War II, was sited far inland to avoid the danger of invasion. It now appears that the mill was not built far enough inland; Korean slabs will soon begin arriving at the new dock in Pittsburg.

—WARNER WOODWORTH

(Warner Woodworth is an associate professor of organizational behavior at Brigham Young University.)



DAVID SUTER

has done contract arms shipments for the CIA. CIA records indicate that the relationship has existed since 1981, says one source. Mass Transit, incorporated in Delaware in 1978 for the "promotion and sale of transportation equipment and related parts and supplies," operates out of a small office above Philadelphia's Suburban Station.

The Mass Transit deals are part of a pattern of off-stage transactions, carried on behind the back of Congress, that funnel military hardware to Guatemala.

In the spring of 1982, even as Thomas Enders, then Assistant Secretary of State, boasted that "in Guatemala, we carefully refrained from backing a regime with a record of serious human-rights violations," troops at Guatemala's Puerto Barrios army base were polishing up their latest acquisition: ten U.S. M-41 tanks, worth \$36 million. According to U.S. officials, the Pentagon and the CIA had arranged for the tanks to arrive from Belgium by way of the Dominican Republic.

The single shipment to General Lucas of the M-41 tanks in late 1981 or early 1982 exceeded in dollar value the sum of all U.S. above-ground military sales to Guatemala in the prior thirty-two years. The transaction amounted to more than the total of the 1981 U.S. military sales to El Salvador, which had emerged in Wash-

ington as the most hotly debated foreign-policy issue of the time.

The tank sale was a byzantine underground transaction approved by Washington but carried out through allied countries. The tanks had originally been supplied by the United States to Belgium through customary country-to-country military sales. After arrangements had been made with the Lucas defense ministry, twenty-two M-41s were shipped out of Antwerp by ASCO, a Belgian arms trader. The destination on the manifest read Santo Domingo. Both the Pentagon and COMCOM, a NATO coordinating committee that reviews technology exports, had licensed the transaction.

Once in the Dominican Republic, however, only twelve went ashore. The remaining ten tanks continued on to Guatemala, where they were unloaded by the navy and taken to the Puerto Barrios base. The CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency monitored the shipment in the Dominican Republic and Guatemala, according to U.S. officials. Formally, the U.S. Government denied involvement in the deal; on April 23, 1982, the State Department's Bureau of Political and Military Affairs issued a telegram to the U.S. embassies in Belgium and Guatemala stating that it was a private shipment never authorized by the United States.

Though the Executive Branch is required by the Arms Export Control Act to

report all such transactions to Congress, no report was filed. The incident first became known outside the Executive Branch when State Department documents referring to the tanks were discovered by auditors from the General Accounting Office. The tanks have seen only limited rural action because of the lack of even rudimentary roads in the Mayan highlands. Since the Lucas administration, however, Guatemalan army engineers have been at work on a packed-gravel, all-weather road from Nenton to Playa Grande, a mountainous expanse that is the heartland of guerrilla support and the focus of army massacres. Pentagon spokesmen say the road's purpose is "to help the villagers get their products to market." A Guatemalan general involved with the project says, however, that the route has been designed to speed troops and hardware to previously remote areas of Indian unrest.

Construction of the route has come to a virtual standstill, hampered by guerrilla attacks and parts shortages. According to U.S. officials in Guatemala, reviving the project is a priority second only to refurbishing the helicopter fleet. The projects now await the \$10 million in foreign military sales credits proposed by the Reagan Administration for Guatemala for fiscal 1987.

The tank transaction wasn't the only back-door arms deal the United States made with the Lucas army. At about the

same time, Guatemala received twenty-three Jet-Ranger helicopters, manufactured by Bell, a subsidiary of the Textron corporation. Though the sale was licensed by the Commerce Department as an ostensibly nonmilitary transaction, in early 1982 twenty pilots from Lucas's air force received training at Bell's headquarters in Fort Worth, Texas, where they learned how to mount .30-caliber machine guns on the helicopters.

The choppers were rushed into the field, where they ferried troops and raided villages as part of the army counterinsurgency. According to Maryland Democrat Michael Barnes, who heads the House Western Hemisphere subcommittee, "the Guatemalan army was systematically massacring the Indian population. Helicopters ... [were] used in those massacres."

During the Rios Montt period, as the Reagan Administration repeatedly tried and failed to win Congressional approval for sale of the \$2 million worth of helicopter parts, the State Department was giving the nod to a separate, costlier deal. In late 1982, it quietly approved a pair of transactions worth \$40 million to supply the Guatemalan air force with two transport jets and eight T-37 trainers.

Though the State Department's decision was ostensibly a matter of public record, Congress was not informed at the time by the State Department, says a spokesman for Barnes. The Guatemalans have yet to receive the planes because they lack the money to purchase them; the deal is still pending.

These back-door arms deals represent only a fraction of the supplies in the pipeline, awaiting approval from the State Department.

During the regime of General Oscar Humberto Mejia Victores, who ruled from August 1983 to January 1986, applications were filed for delivery to Guatemala of 10,000 M-16 assault rifles, 3,350 M-16 laser-aimed sights, and thirty Hughes 500 M-D combat helicopters. All were returned without action, but according to Administration officials, the companies were told to reapply later. A 1984 application for a \$40 million surveillance satellite was denied, but is still eligible for resubmission.

Together with more pedestrian transactions pending—including 500 machine guns, 200 M-2 heavy-barrel guns, and diverse quantities of ammunition—the deals would amount to \$72.5 million in lethal weaponry for Guatemala's rulers. Completion of any one of them would fundamentally alter the nature of the Guatemalan arsenal and represent a quantum leap in American hardware supply; the United States would be well on the way to resuming its role as principal military supplier to Guatemala.

Since the 1977 curtailment of U.S. military sales, Israel has stepped in to fill the gap. That same year, Marcus Katz, a Mexico City-based representative of a group of Israeli arms companies, struck a \$6 million deal with the Guatemalan president, General Kjell Laugerrud, for 15,000 Galil rifles. Subsequent Israeli sales resulted in a complete rearmament of the Guatemalan military.

Israeli shipments included eleven Arava transport planes, ten RE-MK tanks, 120,000 tons of ammunition, three Tair navy patrol boats, a new tactical radio system, and major consignments of eighty-one-millimeter mortars, bazookas, grenade launchers, and Uzi submachine guns—manufactured by PA'AF, the largest Israeli military contractor—for the Guatemalan army's secret police. In December 1981, Israel's Taidiran Electronics and DEGEM Systems helped open the Military School of Electronics and Transmissions. Three years later, Israeli advisers helped design the army's new munitions plant in Alta Verapaz. The factory, which is licensed to produce Galil parts and ammunition, is believed to be the only arms-making facility in Central America.

Last July, according to Western intelligence sources, a CIA-approved shipment of forty assault rifles with telescopic night sights—together with 1,000 grenade launchers—arrived in Guatemala on a KLM flight from Israel.

"There's a strong degree of cooperation between the two countries," says Evan Whirthlin of Action Arms, a Philadelphia distributor of the Galil rifle and the Uzi submachine gun and an agent of Israel Military Industries. "I can't imagine either marketing goods without tacit approval of the other. If Israel started to make a sale the U.S. disapproved of, it would be quashed. Israel depends too much on U.S. aid to be very independent."

Upcoming decisions in Washington will determine whether Israel is still needed. In 1984, the Guatemalan Ministry of Defense concluded negotiations with a U.S. firm for a \$5,750,000 purchase of 10,000 M-16s, sufficient to rearm a third of the Guatemalan force. At the time, the State Department denied a license but encouraged the exporter to reapply.

The proposed \$15 million deal for thirty Hughes 500 M-D light-combat helicopters is potentially the most lethal transaction of all. Outfitted with TOW missiles, which are aimed by optically tracked wire-guide eyesights, the choppers are capable of destroying tanks (which the Guatemalan guerrillas do not have) and small buildings. Manufactured by Hughes Aircraft, a McDonnell-Douglas subsidiary, the helicopters can be outfitted with Hughes Chain Guns—7.62-millimeter machine guns said by the company to be effective for "crew protection and area suppression"—or with 7.62-millimeter Vulcan miniguns capable

of spraying an area with 6,000 rounds per minute.

The Guatemalan military has devastated its own country with a thoroughness usually reserved for invasions of a foreign land. The army's Committee of National Reconstruction says 440 Indian villages have been destroyed. A government survey found more than 200,000 children orphaned by violence since 1978. Estimates of the total civilian death toll run as high as 100,000—more than 1 per cent of the Guatemalan population. Tens of thousands more have disappeared. Last November, when fourteen bodies turned up on the roads of Escuintla in the course of a ten-day period, the morgue was flooded with inquiries from families wondering whether the mutilated remains might be those of their missing loved ones.

The Reagan Administration has downplayed or denied the ongoing carnage waged by the regimes of generals Lucas Garcia, Rios Montt, and Mejia Victores. Only with the arrival of a new government would the truth about its predecessor be admitted in retrospect. Now, with the coming to office of a civilian president, U.S. officials have once again been freed to speak on background about the army governments they once defended.

"The violence against civilians occurred under all of them—Lucas, Rios Montt, Mejia," says one Western observer. "It was done under the guise of making the world safe for democracy, getting rid of communism. But everybody knows what was happening. They were going in and taking out their own people. Scorched earth."

"To say that the army never committed that repression," he says, "is a lie against history."

The new president, Vinicio Cerezo, has kept the army leadership intact and says there will not be prosecutions of officers implicated in past killings and disappearances. Cerezo concedes that his power to restrain the army is limited. In a speech this February, he noted sixty-nine reports of extrajudicial executions during his first three weeks in office.

The Guatemalan army has suffered little more than political embarrassment from the curtailment of open U.S. military aid after 1977. Israel stepped in to fill the gap, and the Reagan Administration opened a pipeline of underground assistance. With a civilian in the National Palace, the Administration hopes to achieve its long-standing objective of restoring open U.S. aid.

As General Paul Gorman, then chief of the U.S. Southern Command, told Congress in August 1984, "Guatemala has an effective army, which is successfully coping with its long-enduring insurgency. With help, they could do it better." ■

A Fraud, a Fumble, and Brute Force

Minutes after a spokesman for the military government came on television to announce that the presidential vote count had been interrupted, the bodyguards of Vinicio Cerezo were sprinting for their ammunition clips. Campaign headquarters was in an uproar. Earlier that day, two more Christian Democrats had been assassinated in El Quiché, and the army had frozen the count with less than 20 per cent of precincts reporting.

Holding their Uzis above their shoulders, Cerezo's security guards ran for the jeeps as their colleagues took up positions along the sandbagged perimeter. "I'm going to the Embassy," Cerezo explained as he jogged to his Cherokee. "We knew this was going to happen. We've been talking about it for months." And what will the Embassy do, he was asked. "You'll see," he said. "The count will resume. Just wait and see what happens when I get back."

Cerezo did indeed return with a victory for his Christian Democrats, but not until four years later. For this was 1982 and in the eyes of the Guatemalan army, Cerezo and his party were still the enemy. After a year of meetings with U.S. Ambassador Frederic Chapin and CIA station chief Robert Hultslander, Cerezo had come to believe that the U.S. Government viewed him differently. He had, he told me, secured their backing for clean elections and, by implication, for the Christian-Democratic candidacy of Alejandro Maldonado Aguirre, an ally of Cerezo, who at thirty-nine was still too young to qualify as a candidate.

But Cerezo was mistaken, as he learned that night. Sitting in their secure third-floor Embassy offices, Hultslander and his staff knew precisely what was going on at the National Palace and at the campaign headquarters of General Angel Anibal Guevara, who was the hand-picked successor of General Fernando Romeo Lucas Garcia. One report from Guevara headquarters detailed the cartons of forged identity cards and bogus tally sheets the army had shipped to the provinces. Another report from the electoral registry noted that 235,000 phantom voters had been added to the rolls three weeks after the registration deadline.

The Embassy knew the tally was a fraud but chose to say otherwise, according to U.S. officials serving in Guatemala at the time. In an off-the-record press briefing, Chapin argued that the election was legitimate. President Reagan wired congratulations. General Gue-



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vara was set to become Guatemala's ninth military head of state since the 1954 CIA coup.

Ten days later, the election—and the U.S. decision to ratify the fraud—backfired. On the morning of March 23, young officers surrounded the National Palace, ousting Lucas and Guevara and installing a junta led by the charismatic evangelical, General Efraín Ríos Montt.

As armored personnel carriers rolled up Sixth Avenue and troops commanded by Captain Rodolfo Muñoz Pilona converged on the National Plaza, the U.S. Embassy's political section overheard a secretary's radio announcing a coup. Running upstairs to the CIA station, a diplomat brought the news to a skeptical chief Hultslander. Five minutes later, he came downstairs and acknowledged what thousands of downtown Guatemalans were already seeing for themselves.

The Ríos Montt coup had caught the Embassy by surprise. Unlike the fraudulent election, which had been conceived and carried out by the Embassy's closest associates in the army high command, the coup had been staged by dissident officers with whom the Embassy had only limited contact.

Five days before the coup, a cable from Colonel George Maynes, U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency attache, arrived at the CIA Central American head-

quarters in Washington. "It said," notes former CIA analyst David MacMichael, who recalls reading the cable at the time, "that after extensive meetings with officers, the DIA had concluded that Lucas had strong support and that coup rumors were unfounded."

Maynes was a confidant of Lucas's brother, General Benedicto Lucas García, who served as army chief of staff. "I'd follow that son-of-a-bitch into combat any time," Maynes told me in 1982. "He's the only one who understands what it takes to win this war." According to Maynes, Benedicto Lucas was the architect of the counterinsurgency campaign, later adopted by Ríos Montt, that included civil patrols, model villages, and army sweeps.

"Benny put together the first civil patrols, we worked together on it," Maynes said. "Unfortunately, his brother [President Romeo Lucas] just didn't take the trouble to take Benny's strategy and put it on the ground nationwide."

Despite his initial distance from Ríos Montt's junta, Maynes says he was still consulted on the new regime's rural strategy. On April 10, 1982, dressed in combat fatigues and accompanied by two young U.S. officers who identified themselves as being on a study tour, Maynes attended the kick-off rally of Ríos Montt's 900,000-man civil patrol.

—A.N.



Presumption of Guilt

BY NAT HENTOFF

"I don't take drugs and I don't believe I have to piss in a bottle to prove I don't."

—Bob Stanley, pitcher,
Boston Red Sox

"If you hang all the people, you'll get all the guilty."

—Tom T. Hall,
country singer

In March, Ira Glasser, executive director of the American Civil Liberties Union, sent a letter to twenty of the nation's largest labor unions inviting them to take part in a series of seminars this fall to work out a strategy for the unions and the ACLU to protect the privacy of Americans where they work.

"Government employees and employees of private industry, railway workers and baseball players," Glasser wrote, "are being required in ever greater numbers to prove their innocence by submitting to intrusive and humiliating urine and blood tests." The seminars, he said, would deal not only with "random drug testing of people not suspected of using drugs" but also with "other violations of the right to privacy of the workplace."

As many workers can testify, privacy rights in the workplace have been eroding for a long time by means that range from management eavesdropping on employee telephone calls to placement of hidden mi-

crophones in employee washrooms in order to pick up intelligence concerning "troublemakers." What prompted Glasser's rallying cry, however, was the proclamation of an unprecedented massive and official attack on workers' privacy.

On March 2, the President's Commission on Organized Crime strongly recommended—in the name of "national security"—that all Federal employees be tested for drug use. Not particular individuals about whom some reasonable suspicion of drug abuse exists, but *all* employees. Furthermore, the Commission urged all private employers who have Federal contracts to begin dragnet testing of their workers. If the contractors refuse, they should be denied any further Government business.

The Commission went on to recommend that all private employers, not just those with Federal contracts, start collecting urine samples and otherwise screen their workers from drug use. Peter Rodino, chairman of the House Judiciary Committee and a member of the President's Commission on Organized Crime, objected strenuously, noting that such wholesale testing "raises civil-liberties concerns." Nonsense, said Attorney General Edwin Meese, a mail-order scholar of the Framers' intentions on these matters. No unlawful search and seizure is involved, Meese explained, because, "by definition, it's not an unreasonable seizure because it's something the employee consents to as a condition of employment."

In other words, when the boss tells you to pee in a bottle if you want to keep your job, you consent to that condition if you don't want to lose your job.

At the press conference with the Attor-

ney General was the chairman of the President's Commission, Judge Irving Kaufman of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. Kaufman was the judge who sent Ethel and Julius Rosenberg to the electric chair after praying earnestly for guidance, thus making God an accomplice in the execution. As the years went on, Kaufman, extremely sensitive to charges that he was the prosecutor's judge in the Rosenberg case, has developed an exceptional reputation as a defender of First Amendment rights of defendants, especially the press, against the Government. But now, in the twilight of his career, Kaufman has again become the prosecutor's judge by supporting dragnet drug testing of millions of Americans.

The testing he and the majority of the Commission advocate, says Kaufman, is no more an invasion of privacy than requiring any American to walk through metal detectors at an airport. However, as Tom Wicker noted in *The New York Times*, "Having one's bodily fluids forcibly and randomly inspected is substantially different from putting one's luggage through an electronic device."

What's more, the drug tests aren't even accurate. "The most commonly used urine test is notoriously unreliable," Ira Glasser noted in an ACLU statement. "It cannot identify specific drugs and it cannot distinguish between common cold medicine and illegal substances like marijuana and cocaine. The test cannot determine when someone used a particular drug, or to what extent. And it cannot measure impairment of the ability to function on the job."

There are also blood tests for drugs, and they reveal much more than the Government or a private employer claims to be

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